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GEBSER V LAGO VISTA SCHOOL DISTRICT:
A LOOK AT SCHOOL DISTRICTS' LIABILITY
FOR TEACHER-STUDENT SEXUAL
HARASSMENT
INTRODUCTION
In the last several years, the news has prominently featured
instances of sexual harassment in schools. For example, in 1996, a
Lexington, North Carolina, first grade student was suspended from
school for a day for kissing a classmate on the cheek, because the kiss
violated the school's sexual harassment policy.' While in Seattle,
Washington, a former grade school teacher is serving a seven-year
prison term for raping a thirteen-year-old student and has now two
children fathered by the student.2 With stories such as these filling
newspapers around the country, courts have struggled to articulate
standards governing school liability for sexual harassment.
Unfortunately, courts adopted inconsistent standards, and,
consequently, the ability of a student to recover damages from a
I. Emmalena K. Quesada, Note, Innocent Kiss or Potential Legal Nightmare: Peer
Sexual Harassment and the Standardfor School Liability Under Title LY, 83 CORNELL L. REV.
1014, 1015 (1998). Quesada cites several articles related to the incident, including one in the
Boston Globe which reported that the school did not actually suspend the boy, but "sent him to
another room for misbehavior, and that the school did not characterize his act as sexual
harassment, but as 'unwanted touching."' Id. at 1015 n.5, citing Ellen Goodman, The Truth
Behind "the Kiss," BOSTON GLOBE, Oct 13, 1996, at D7. Regardless of which account is true,
the story reported around the nation of a six-year-old suspended for sexual harassment caused
many Americans to question whether the sexual harassment issue had gone too far. Id. at 1016.
2. Arthur Santana, Imprisoned Letourneau is Pregnant, SEATTLE TIMES, Mar. 15, 1998,
atAl.
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school district for sexual harassment varied depending on the
jurisdiction. However, in its 1998 term, the Supreme Court addressed
this issue of the liability of school districts under Title IX in teacher-
student sexual harassment cases in Gebser v. Lago Vista Indep. Sch.
Dist.3 There the Court articulated a standard of deliberate indifference
to actual knowledge for determining the liability of school districts
when a teacher or administrator sexually harasses students.4
This recent development examines the decision in Gebser v. Lago
Vista Independent School District and its standard for teacher-student
sexual harassment.5 Part I explores the history surrounding this issue
and the recent Supreme Court decision. Part II analyzes the Supreme
Court's refusal to extend Title VII principles governing employer
liability for workplace sexual harassment to the Title IX context. Part
III considers the affect of the Gebser decision on school districts, as
well as the use of this decision in the appeal of Davis v. Monroe
County Board of Education,6 a student-student sexual harassment
case recently granted certiorari by the Court.
I. HISTORY
In Gebser v. Lago Vista Independent School District, the Supreme
Court held that a school district is not liable for teacher-student
sexual harassment under Title IX unless a school district official had
actual notice of, and is deliberately indifferent to, the teacher's
misconduct.8 The decision resolved a circuit split on the issue of
3. 524U.S.274. 118 S.Ct. 1989 (1998).
4. Id. Recent studies have shown that over seventy percent of middle and high school
students have been sexually harassed at school. See Kaija Clark, Note, School Liability and
Compensation for Title IX Sexual Harassment Violations by Teachers and Peers, 66 GEO.
WASH. L. REV. 353, 353 n.1 (1998). Although other students inflict a large proportion of this
harassment, approximately eighteen percent of the students who reported an incident of
harassment said school staff members also harassed them. See Louis HARRIS & ASSOCIATES,
HOSTILE HALLWAYS: THE AAUW SURVEY ON SEXUAL HARASSMENT IN AMERICA'S SCHOOLS
4 (1993).
5. 524 U.S. 274.
6. 120 F.3d 1390 (1 1th Cir. 1997). In Davis, the Eleventh Circuit held that Title IX does
not allow a claim for damages based upon student-student sexual harassment.
7. Davis v. Monroe County Bd. ofEduc., 119 S. Ct. 29 (1998).
8. 118 S. Ct. 1989. The Court defined the term school district official as someone who,
at a minimum, has the authority to institute corrective measures on the district's behalf. Id. at
1999.
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school district liability for teacher-student sexual harassment.9
The Court first considered the issue of a student's recovery under
Title IX in Franklin v. Gwinnett County Public Schools, where they
held that there was an available damages remedy for an action
brought to enforce Title IX.1° In making this decision, the Court
looked at the legislative history of Title IX and determined that
Congress, in enacting Title IX and subsequent amendments, did not
intend to limit the available." Therefore, the Court found that a
student could recover monetary damages under Title IX. The
Franklin Court, however, did not decide on a standard of liability for
courts to determine the liability of school districts for teacher-student
sexual harassment.'
2
9. See, e.g., Kracunas v. Iona College, 119 F.3d 80 (2d Cir. 1997) (using Title VHI
agency principles); Rosa H. v. San Elizario Indep. Sch. Dist., 106 F.3d 648 (5th Cir. 1997)
(supporting actual knowledge standard); Canutillo Indep. Sch. Dist. V. Leija, 101 F.3d 393 (5th
Cir. 1996) (refusing a strict liability standard); Kinman v. Omaha Pub. Sch. Dist., 94 F.3d 463
(8th Cir. 1996) (adopting deliberate indifference standard); Lipsett v. Univ. of P.1R, 864 F.2d
881 (1st Cir. 1988) (advocating the constructive notice standard); Kadiki v. Va. Commonwealth
Univ., 892 F.Supp 746 (E.D. Va. 1995) (advocating the strict liability standard for quid pro
harassment).
10. 503 U.S. 60 (1992). See also Cannon v. University of Chicago, 441 U.S. 677 (1979),
(holding that there is an implied right of action under Title X). In Franklin, the Court went
further so to determine what remedies were available under this private right, and noted that the
question of what remedies are available under a statute is a different question than whether that
right exists in the first place. 503 U.S. at 65.
11. 503 U.S. at 72. See also Pennhurst State Sch. and Hosp. v. Halderman, 451 U.S. 1,
28-29 (1981), (observing that remedies were limited under Spending Clause statutes when the
violation was unintentional because an entity receiving federal funds lacked notice that it would
be liable for damages for an unintentional violation). The Court in Franklin noted that this
theory did not apply in Title IX cases such as the one before it because the plaintiff alleged
intentional discrimination that was proscribed by the statute at issue. 503 U.S. at 74-75. The
Court said, "Congress surely did not intend for federal moneys to be expended to support the
intentional actions it sought by statute to proscribe." Id. at 75.
In Gebser, however, the Court held that the school district was not liable in damages for the
harassment at issue because the school did not have notice of the harassment. In Gebser, the
Court found an unintentional violation, and therefore held that the school district could not be
liable under Title IX without notice, because Title IX is a spending clause statute. 118 S. Ct. at
1998.
12. 503 U.S. 60. Although the Court did not reach this issue, several lower courts have
cited Franklin for the proposition that the Supreme Court advocated the use of Title VII agency
principles in deciding Title IX cases. See, e.g., Doe v. Claiborne County, Tennessee, 103 F.3d
495 (6th Cir. 1996). "By citing Meritor Savings Bank ... a Title VII hostile environment case,
the Court indicated that it views with approval the application of Title VII principles to resolve
similar Title IX cases."). Id. at 514. A precise reading of Franklin, however, shows that the
Court only cited Meritor for the proposition that discrimination on the basis of sex constitutes
1999]
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Prior to the decision in Gebser, courts used several different
theories to determine the liability of school districts in cases
involving student-teacher sexual harassment. 13 The most commonly
used theories consist of the agency principle standard, the "knew or
should have known" standard, and the strict liability standard. 4
Under the agency principle standard, a school district is liable for the
actions of a teacher acting outside the scope of employment in three
situations: if the district intended the discrimination, if the district
was negligent or reckless, or if the teacher was aided in
accomplishing the harassment because of the existence of the agency
relationship.
1 5
The "knew or should have known" standard, also known as the
constructive notice standard, was the most often used, finding a
school district liable for teacher-student sexual harassment if a school
district official knew or should have known about the harassment.1
6
This standard was borrowed from Title VII cases, and several courts
had carried it over to Title IX situations.
1 7
sexual harassment. 503 U.S. at 75.
13. See Kinman, 94 F.3d 463; Vickie J. Brady, Note, Borrowing Standards to Fit the
Title-Do They Really Fit? Title VII Standards Applied in Title IX Educational Harassment
Claim as the ConflictAmong the Courts Continues, 22 S. ILL U. L.J. 411,419 (1998).
14. Brady, supra note 13, at423-28.
15. Id. at423.
16. See Kracunas v. Iona College, 119 F.2d 80 (holding that if a professor does not rely on
his actual or apparent authority to carry out the harassment, the university is only liable if it
knew or in the exercise of reasonable care should have known about the harassment and failed
to take remedial action); Kinman v. Omaha Pub. Sch. Dist, 94 F.3d 463 (finding that Title VII
standards of institutional liability should apply to hostile environment sexual harassment cases
involving a teacher's harassment of a student); Ward v. Johns Hopkins University, 861 F.Supp.
367 (D. Maryland 1994) ("In a Title IX case, an educational institution is liable... if (sic) an
official representing that institution knew, or... should have known, of the harassment's
occurrence, unless (sic) that official can show that he or she took appropriate steps to halt it."
(citing Lipsett v. Univ. of P.R., 864 F.2d 881, 898-901 (1st Cir. 1988)).
Under the constructive notice standard, a school district is liable for teacher-student sexual
harassment if the school district knew about the harassment and failed to remedy it, or if the
harassment was pervasive enough that the school district should have been aware of the
harassment and failed to remedy it.
17. See Kinman, 94 F.3d 463; Lipsett, 864 F.2d 881.
In Kinman the court said, "We recently held that Title VII standards for proving
discriminatory treatment should be applied to employment discrimination cases brought under
Title IX. We now extend that holding to apply Title VII standards of institutional liability to
hostile environment sexual harassment cases involving a teacher's harassment of a student." 94
F.3d at 469 (citation omitted).
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_urbanlaw/vol55/iss1/14
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Under the strict liability standard, school districts were liable for
teacher-student sexual harassment in any situation whether or not the
school knew or even could have known about the harassment.'8 In
Gebser, the Supreme Court rejected all of these standard and made it
even more difficult for a student to recover damages from a school
district under Title IX.19
The case arose after a teacher at Lago Vista High School was
discovered having sex with a student.20 The school immediately
terminated the teacher's employment, and the state revoked his
teaching license.2 1 Although the relationship lasted for approximately
one year, Gebser, the student, never reported the teacher's conduct to
school officials.22 However, other students had reported inappropriate
comments made by the teacher to the school principal, but the
principal only gave the teacher a warning.2 3 Moreover, the principal
never reported the incident to the superintendent, who also served as
the district's Title IX coordinator.2 4 In November 1993, the police
discovered the relationship, and Gebser and her mother filed suit
The court went on to note that the "knew or should have known" standard was the
applicable standard in cases involving a teacher's hostile environment harassment of a student.
Id.
18. See Canutillo Indep. Sch. Dist. v. Leija, 887 F. Supp 947 (W.D. Tex. 1995), rev'd, 101
F.3d 393 (5th Cir. 1996); Bolon v. Rolla Public Sch., 917 F. Supp 1423 (E.D. Mo. 1995). See
also, Kracunas, 119 F.3d 80 (holding that if a professor had a supervisory relationship over a
student, and used that relationship to further harassment of the student, the university would be
strictly liable for the professor's conduct); Kadiki, 892 F. Supp. 746 (finding that when a
professor engages in quid pro quo harassment, a university will be held strictly liable for the
conduct).
19. 118 S. Ct. 1989. It is interesting to note that cases deciding upon all three standards in
the federal circuits-strict liability, constructive notice, and agency principles-say that they
get their standards from Title VII. These courts say that they are base their standards on Title
VII principles, even though they are all interpreting those Title VII principles differently. See
supra note 9. In Gebser, the Court rejected the use of Title VII as a standard of liability under
Title IX, thereby rejecting all of the standards previously described. 118 S. Ct. 1989.
20. 118 S. Ct. 1993. Frank Waldrop, a teacher at Lago Vista High School, initiated a
sexual relationship with Alida Gebser when she was a freshman in high school. The relationship
continued until a policeman found the teacher having sex with the student. The teacher and
student often engaged in sexual intercourse during class time, but never on the school property.
Id.
21. Id.
22. Id. Gebser testified that she did not report the teacher's conduct because she was
uncertain how to react and wanted to continue having him as a teacher. Id.
23. Id.
24. Id.
1999]
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against Waldrop and the school district in state court, raising claims
against the school district under Title IX, 25 42 U.S.C. § 1983,26 and
state negligence law. After being removed to federal court, the
district court granted summary judgment in favor of the school
district on the Title TX and § 1983 claims. The court remanded the
allegations against Waldrop back to the state court.
The Supreme Court heard this case on an appeal of the Fifth
Circuit's decision in Doe.28 The Fifth Circuit rejected several theories
of liability considered by courts, and held that a school district could
not be liable for teacher-student sexual harassment unless an
employee with supervisory powers knew of the harassment, had the
power to end it, and failed to do so. 29 In making this decision, the
25. Education Amendments of 1972, §§ 901-909, 20 U.S.C. §§ 1681-1688 (1994). Title
IX states, "[n]o person in the United States shall, on the basis of sex, be excluded from
participation in, be denied the benefits of, or be subjected to discrimination under any education
program or activity receiving Federal financial assistance." 20 U.S.C. § 168 l(a).
26. 42 U.S.C. § 1983 states,
"[e]very person who, under color of any statute, ordinance, regulation, custom, or
usage, of any State... subjects, or causes to be subjected, any citizen of the United
States or other person within the jurisdiction thereof to the deprivation of any rights,
privileges, or immunities secured by the Constitution and laws, shall be liable to the
party injured in an action at law, suit in equity, or other proper proceeding for redress."
See also Doe v. Claiborne County, Tenn., 103 F.3d 495 (6th Cir. 1996). In Doe, the Sixth
Circuit said, "[a] plaintiff can bring a claim under section 1983 when she is deprived 'of any
rights, privileges, or immunities secured by the Constitution and laws,' as a result 'of any
statute, ordinance, regulation, custom, or usage, of any State."' Id. at 505. The court then laid
out a two-pronged inquiry for establishing a § 1983 claim against a school board. First, the
plaintiff must assert a deprivation of a constitutional right and second, the school board must be
responsible for that violation. To establish liability, both prongs must be satisfied. Id. at 505-06.
27. Gebser, 118 S. Ct. at 1993. The district court granted summary judgment on the theory
that the discrimination could only be interpreted as a policy of the school district if a school
administrator had notice of the discrimination and failed to respond. Id. at 1993-94. The Fifth
Circuit affirmed the District Court, relying on two of its recent decisions. Id. at 1994. See Rosa
H. v. San Elizario Indep. Sch. Dist., 106 F.3d 648 (5th Cir. 1997) and Canutillo Indep. Sch.
Dist. v. Leifa, 101 F.3d 393 (5th Cir. 1996). These cases held that school districts were not
liable for teacher-student sexual harassment under Title IX unless "a school official who had
actual knowledge of the abuse was invested by the school board with the duty to supervise the
employee and the power to take action that would end such abuse and failed to do so." Rosa H.,
106 F.3d at 660.
28. Doe v. Lago Vista Indep. Sch. Dist., 106 F.3d 1223 (5th Cir. 1997).
29. Id. at 1225-26. The court first rejected the strict liability theory, stating that a school
district was not absolutely liable because," '[s]imply put, strict liability is not part of the Title
IX contract.' " Id. (quoting Leija, 101 F.3d 393, 399). Then, the court considered the
constructive notice theory of liability which it approved of, but noted that Doe did not pursue
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_urbanlaw/vol55/iss1/14
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court relied on its holding in Rosa H. v. San Elizario Indep. Sch.
Dist., which had already decided this same issue.
30
The Supreme Court affirmed the Fifth Circuit's decision.3 In
Gebser, the petitioners advanced two theories for holding the school
district liable for the teacher's conduct.32 First, petitioners argued that
the school district should be held liable under the vicarious liability
principle.33 Second, they argued that, at a minimum, the Court should
hold the school district liable on a theory of constructive notice. 4
The Court rejected these theories of liability because they
frustrated the purposes of Title IX?3 In determining the appropriate
standard of liability, the Court attempted to determine Congress'
this theory because there was not enough evidence to show that the school had constructive
notice of the teacher's behavior. Doe, 106 F.3d at 1225.
Additionally, the court refused to invoke the common law principle of vicarious liability,
which held an employer liable when the existence of an agency relationship aided an agent in
accomplishing a tort. Id. at 1225-26. The court rejected this theory because it would generate
vicarious liability in almost all cases of teacher-student sexual harassment, regardless of the
circumstances. Id. at 1226.
30. 106 F.3d 648. The court in Doe said,
"[u]nder Rosa H., school districts are not liable in tort for teacher-student harassment
under Title IX unless an employee who has been invested by the school board with
supervisory power over the offending employee actually knew of the abuse, had the
power to end the abuse, and failed to do so."
103 F.3d at 1226. Sexual Harassment Guidance: Harassment of Students by School Employees,
Other Students, or Third Parties, 62 Fed. Reg. 12,034 (1997). The Office of Civil Rights, the
primary agency responsible for regulating Title IX issues, noted the Fifth Circuit's decisions in
Leija and Rosa H. v., and stated that these decisions applied Title IX in a "manner inconsistent
with OCR's longstanding policy and practice." Id. at 12.036. The OCR suggested, however,
that these inconsistent decisions did not prohibit school districts located in the Fifth Circuit
from following the Final Policy Guidance. In fact, school districts would be better off following
the Final Policy Guidance to ensure that they were in compliance with the requirements of Title
IX. Id.
31. 118S.Ct. 1989.
32. Id. at 1996.
33. Id. Petitioners argued that the court should hold the school district liable for damages
when his or her position of authority aided a teacher in carrying out the sexual harassment. This
liability, petitioners argued, should exist regardless of whether the school district officials had
any notice of the teacher's conduct, and irrespective of their response when they became aware
of the conduct. Id. See also Doe v. Lago Vista Indep. Sch. Dist., 106 F.3d 1223, 1225.
34. Gebser, 118 S. Ct. at 1996. Petitioners argued that the school district was liable
because it should have known about the harassment and failed to eliminate it. Id.
35. Id. at 1997. "[lt would 'frustrate the purposes' of Title IX to permit a damages
recovery against a school district for a teacher's sexual harassment of a student based on
principles of respondeat superior or constructive notice, i.e. (sic), without actual notice to a
school district official." Id.
1999]
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intent regarding available remedies under the act, and concluded that
Congress did not intend to allow recovery in damages when liability
rested on vicarious liability or constructive notice. A stricter standard
is more appropriate to carry out Congress' intent regarding available
remedies.3 Therefore, the Court held that a school district official
with the authority to institute corrective measures must have actual
knowledge of the harassment and fail to do anything about it before a
school district can be held liable for teacher-student sexual
harassment.37
II. REJECTION OF TITLE VII PRINCIPLES IN TITLE IX CASES
In Gebser, the Supreme Court rejected the use of Title VII
principles in Title IX cases, and set up a standard making it much
more difficult for students to recover damages from school districts in
cases of teacher-student sexual harassment.38 This decision represents
a distinct departure from the analysis used by most lower courts in
Title IX cases. 39 The resulting standard seems especially harsh in
light of the fact that the Court also decided two Title VII cases during
the same term as Gebser making it easier for employees to recover
damages from their employers in similar situations. 40 The Court,
however, noted several reasons for rejecting the typical Title VII
analysis in Title IX cases.
A. Lower Courts and Commentators Advocated the Use of Title VII
Principles in Title IX Cases.
Many lower courts and several commentators advocated the use of
36. Id. The Court noted that requiring school district officials to have actual notice of the
discrimination and giving them a chance to correct the situation avoids diverting educational
funding from beneficial uses when the recipient was unaware of the discrimination and would
be willing to institute corrective measures. Id. at 1999.
37. Id.
38. 118 S. Ct. 1999.
39. See supra notes 16-19 and accompanying text. The new approach also rejected the
argument used by lower courts that the Supreme Court embraced Title VII analysis in Title IX
cases by citing Meritor in the Franklin decision. See .supra note 12.
40. See Burlington Indus. v. Ellerth, 118 S. Ct. 2257 (1998); Faragher v. City of Boca
Raton, Fla., 118 S. Ct. 2275 (1998). See infra notes 41 and 48.
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_urbanlaw/vol55/iss1/14
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Title VII principles in Title IX cases.4' One reason for this was
because Title VII has been the source of much litigation, and
therefore, an organized framework has developed for harassment
suits under Title VII. 42 In Title VII hostile environment cases, courts
consistently used the "knew or should have known" or "constructive
notice" standard to determine liability.43 Several courts also applied
this standard in teacher-student sexual harassment cases. 44
Commentators advocated the use of Title VII principles in these cases
because sexual harassment in the education context is similar to, and
perhaps more harmful to, students than sexual harassment of
41. See Clark, supra note 4. Title VII provides that, "Mt shall be unlawful employment
practice for an employer ... to discriminate against any individual with respect to his
compensation, terms, conditions, or privileges of employment, because of such individual's
race, color, religion, sex, or national origin." 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000e to 2000e-17 (1984). Federal
courts recognize two different types of sexual harassment claims under Title VII: quid pro quo
harassment, in which concrete employment benefits are conditioned on sexual favors, and
hostile environment harassment, in which an employer's discrimination creates a sexually
hostile or abusive work environment.
When an employer or supervisor commits quid pro quo harassment, the employer is liable
if the plaintiff proves that the harassment occurred, regardless of whether the employer knew or
should have known about the harassment. See Meritor Savings Bank, FSB v. Vinson, 477 U.S.
57, 70-71 (1986).
Under a hostile environment claim, the employer is subject to vicarious liability for an
actionable hostile environment created by a supervisor with immediate (or higher) authority
over the employee they victimize. If the supervisor's conduct does not result in a tangible
employment action, the employer may raise an affirmative defense to liability or damages. If
the harassment does result in a tangible employment action, such as hiring, firing, or failing to
promote an employee, the employer is strictly liable. See Burlington Indus. v. Ellerth, 118 S. Ct
2257, 2269; Faragher v. City of Boca Raton, Fla., 118 S. Ct. 2275, 2293.
42. Clark, supra note 4, at 375-76.
"Sexual harassment under Title VII ... has been fully analyzed by federal courts. The
Supreme Court has heard multiple Title VII sexual harassment cases and has guided
lower courts on appropriate proof constructs for Title VII injury and liability. Because
Title VII proof constructs are well established, and because sexual harassment in the
educational context is analogous to sexual harassment in the workplace, Title VII
standards are useful to apply in Title IX cases."
Id. at 376.
43. See Harris v. Forklift Systems, 510 U.S. 17 (1993); Meritor Savings Bank, FSB v.
Vinson, 477 U.S. 57 (1986). Last term, however, the Supreme Court changed this standard, and
now holds employers strictly liable for hostile environment sexual harassment that results in a
tangible employment action. See Burlington Indus. v. Ellerth, 118 S. Ct. 2257; Faragher v. City
of Boca Raton, Fla., 118 S. Ct. 2275.
44. See Kinman v. Omaha Pub. Sch. Dist., 94 F.3d 463; Lipsett v. Univ. of P.R., 864 F.2d
1999]
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employees in the workplace.45 In addition, the Office of Civil Rights
("OCR"), the administrative agency responsible for enforcing Title
IX, advocated the use of the "knew or should have known
standard. ,
46
Many have argued that good public policy mandated it should be
at least as easy for students to recover for sexual harassment by their
teachers as it is for employees to recover damages for sexual
harassment by their supervisors. 47 Although it may be economically
infeasible for an employee to leave his or her place of employment, it
is almost impossible for a student, especially a young child, to leave
his or her school. In addition, the long-term effects of sexual
harassment may be greater for school children than for adult
employees. 48 Therefore, from a public policy standpoint, it seems odd
that the Court would make it more difficult for students to recover
damages for sexual harassment than employees. In Gebser, however,
the Court set a standard that made it much more difficult for students
to recover damages from school districts under Title IX than it was
for employees to recover damages from their employers under TitleVII.49
45. Clark, supra note 4, at 375-76.
46. See Sexual Harassment Guidance, supra note 30, at 12,034-36.
47. Stephen Ganter, Note, Sexual Harassment in Elementary and Junior High Schools:
The Cruel Dilemma for School Boards, 22 T. MARSHALL L. REV. 121, 140-41 (1996). In his
article, Ganter looks to the Eleventh Circuits' decision in Davis v. Monroe County, in which the
court argued that the damages caused by sexual harassment are greater in the school context
than in the employment context.
The harassment has a greater and longer lasting impact on its young victims, and
institutionalizes sexual harassment as accepted behavior. Moreover, as economically
difficult as it may be for adults to leave a hostile workplace, it is virtually impossible
for children to leave their assigned school. Finally, [a] nondiscriminatory environment
is essential to maximum intellectual growth and is therefore an integral part of the
educational benefits that a student receives. A sexually abusive environment inhibits, if
not prevents, the harassed student from developing her full intellectual potential and
receiving the most from the academic program.
Id. quoting Davis v. Monroe County, 74 F.3d 1186 (11th Cir. 1996).
48. Ganter, supra note 47.
49. See Gebser, 118 S. Ct. 1989. But see Burlington Indus. v. Ellerth, 118 S. Ct. 2257;
Faragher v. City ofBoca Raton, Fla., 118 S. Ct. 2275.
In Burlington Industries and Faragher, the Court held that an employer is subject to
vicarious liability to a victimized employee for an actionable hostile environment created by a
supervisor with immediate (or higher) authority over the employee. If the supervisor's conduct
does not result in a tangible employment action, the employer may raise an affirmative defense
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_urbanlaw/vol55/iss1/14
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B. The Court's Justification for Rejecting the Title VII Framework in
Title IX Cases
The Court had several justifications for rejecting the Title VII
framework and creating a new standard for Title IX cases. First, the
Court noted that Title IX was enacted so that federal money would
not support gender discrimination and to protect individuals against
such behavior.50 The Court did acknowledge that Congress modeled
Title IX after Title VI, which is the same as Title IX except that it
prohibits race discrimination rather than sex discrimination and
applies to all programs receiving federal funds, not just educational
institutions. 51 Also, both of these statutes were enacted under the
Spending Clause of the Constitution. The federal funds are
conditioned on a promise by the recipient not to discriminate in
violation of the act, therefore creating a contract between the
Government and the recipient.52
However, Title IX is different from Title VII as Title IX is a
condition on the receipt of funding and not an outright prohibition on
discrimination. The Court noted this distinction and stated that while
Title VII seeks to provide compensation, Title IX looks to protect
from gender discrimination perpetuated by those who receive federal
money. 53 This distinction is important because it constitutes the main
reason why the Court set a different standard of liability for Title IX.
Also, the Court set a stricter standard of liability for Title IX
because Title IX awards an entity federal funds if the entity meets
to liability or damages.
50, 118 S. Ct. 1989, 1997.
51. Id.
52. Id. See In Pennhurst State School and Hospital v. Halderman, 451 U.S. 1 (1981).
[L]egislation enacted pursuant to the spending power is much in the nature of a
contract: in return for federal funds, the States agree to comply with federally imposed
conditions. The legitimacy of Congress' power to legislate under the spending power
thus rests on whether the State voluntarily and knowingly accepts the terms of the
"contract."... Accordingly, if Congress intends to impose a condition on the grant of
federal moneys, it must do so unambiguously... By insisting that Congress speak
with a clear voice, we enable the States to exercise their choice knowingly, cognizant
of the consequences of their participation.
451 U.S. at 17. See also Guardians Assn. V. Civil Serv. Comm'n of New York City, 463 U.S.
582, 599 (1983).
53. Gebser, 118S. Ct. at 1998.
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certain conditions.5 4 Under this contract-like relationship between the
government and the receiving entity, an entity must be given notice
before this receipt of funds can be limited. According to the Court,
when a program or entity is to receive funds based on meeting a
certain condition, the entity must be put on notice that it may be
liable for a monetary award.56 This notice requirement is the key
justification for the Court's strict standard in Gebser. If the
discrimination by the entity is unintentional, and therefore the entity
does not have actual knowledge of it, then the entity is unaware that it
is in violation of the condition.57 For this reason, the theories of
constructive notice and respondeat superior are inappropriate in this
context.5
Additionally, the Court in Gebser found that the methods used to
enforce Title IX supported the requirement of actual notice.59
Administrative agencies primarily enforce Title IX but are not
allowed to initiate enforcement proceedings until they have advised
the entity of the failure to comply with the condition and determined
that voluntary compliance.60 Only at this point may the agency take
action, and even then, the regulations do not contemplate the payment
of damages, only the withholding of federal funds to the entity in
violation.6' The Court points out that the central purpose of the notice
requirement, allowing an opportunity for voluntary compliance, is to
not let federal education money be kept from a school where the
school was not aware of the discrimination and is willing to quickly
remedy the situation.
62
For these reasons, the Court rejected the use of Title VII
principles for finding school districts liable for teacher-student sexual
harassment. The Court's justifications make sense because schools
need all of the federal funding they can obtain for educational
54. Id.
55. Id.
56. Id.
57. Id.
58. Id.
59. 118 S. Ct at 1998.
60. Id.
61. Id.
62. Id. at 1999.
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purposes, and this funding should not necessarily be spent to
compensate victims of harassment. Students who have suffered
harassment at the hands of their teachers should, be compensated,
however, and Title IX is the primary source of recovery.63
Although the reasoning behind the Supreme Court's new standard
for Title IX cases is logical, this standard may have an adverse effect
on students. The high standard for liability may allow school districts
to relax their stance on sexual harassment in schools, and may cause
more students to suffer from the effects of sexual harassment than
ever before.
64
III. THE EFFECT OF THE GEBSER DECISION ON SCHOOL DISTRICTS
After the decision in Gebser, this new standard of liability will
affect how school districts deal with sexual harassment. Realistically,
the Gebser decision should have little adverse effect on school
districts. The most likely result is that school districts will now relax
their standards on sexual harassment, because it will be more difficult
63. The Gebser Court recognized that sexual harassment is unfortunately a common
occurrence in schools. Although, the Court's opinion recognized that harassment is a problem,
the Court did not believe that the independent acts of a teacher should make the school district
liable under Title IX. The Court said,
No one questions that a student suffers extraordinary harm when subjected to sexual
harassment and abuse by a teacher, and that the teacher's conduct is reprehensible and
undermines the basic purpose of the educational system. The issue in this case,
however, is whether the independent misconduct of a teacher is attributable to the
school district that employs him under a specific federal statute designed primarily to
prevent recipients of federal financial assistance from using the funds in a
discriminatory manner. Our decision does not affect any right of recovery that an
individual may have against a school district as a matter of state law or under 42
U.S.C. § 1983. Until Congress speaks directly on the subject, however, we will not
hold a school district liable in damages under Title IX for a teacher's harassment of a
student absent actual notice and deliberate indifference.
Id at 2000. On this point, the Gebser dissent, written by Justice Stevens and joined by Justice
Souter, Justice Ginsburg, and Justice Breyer, persuasively states,
Presumably, few Title IX plaintiffs who have been victims of intentional
discrimination will be able to recover damages under this exceedingly high standard.
The Court fails to recognize that its holding will virtually 'render inutile causes of
action authorized by Congress through a decision that no remedy is available.'
118 S. Ct at 2006, citing Franklin, 503 U.S. 60 at 74.
64. See Clark, supra note 4.
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for students to recover monetary damages against the districts.65
School districts are not required to establish sexual harassment
policies,66 and those school districts that do establish policies may
make them more lenient if the district will only be liable when it
knows of the harassment and deliberately ignores it.67
Additionally, this standard may cause school administrators to
blind themselves to harassment, so that they can claim they did not
have actual knowledge. The Court in Gebser avoids this argument by
commenting that students will still have causes of action against their
school districts under section § 1983 and state law.68 The Court has,
however, taken away a major route to recovery for students who have
suffered from sexual harassment at the hands of their teachers.
Next term, the Supreme Court will address a similar issue, that of
a school district's liability for student-student sexual harassment in
schools. 69 Based upon the Court's justification for limiting liability in
65. The Gebser dissent recognized this problem. The dissent said,
The reason why the common law imposes liability on the principal in such
circumstances is the same as the reason why Congress included the prohibition against
discrimination on the basis of sex in Title IX: to induce school boards to adopt and
enforce practices that will minimize the danger that vulnerable students will be
exposed to such odious behavior. The rule that the Court has crafted creates the
opposite incentive. As long as school boards can insulate themselves from knowledge
about this sort of conduct, they can claim immunity from damages liability. Indeed, the
rule that the Court adopts would preclude a damages remedy even if every teacher at
the school knew about the harassment but did not have the 'authority to institute
corrective measures on the district's behalf.
118 S. Ct. at 2004, citing majority at 2000.
66. 34 C.F.R. § 106.8(b) (1995) The Regulations of the Office of the Department of
Education only require schools to "adopt and publish grievance procedures providing for
prompt and equitable resolution of student and employee complaints alleging any action which
would be prohibited by [Title IX]." Id.
67. See Gebser, 118 S. CL at 2000. There, the majority found that the absence of an
effective harassment policy and grievance procedure did not establish "The requisite actual
notice and deliberate indifference necessary to find liability on the part of the school district."
Id. The Court found that the failure to establish a grievance procedure did not by itself
constitute discrimination under Title IX. Id.
68. See supra note 26.
69. See supra note 6. The Court recently granted certiorari in Davis v. Monroe County,
120 F.3d 1390 (11th Cir. 1997), a student-student sexual harassment case decided by the
Eleventh Circuit. In Davis, the Court stated that it did not think that the school board was on
notice that it could be held liable in this type of situation when it accepted Title IX funds. Id. at
1400. Following the same type of analysis the Supreme Court used in Gebser, the court said,
"[N]othing in the language or history of Title IX suggests that Title IX imposes
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the teacher-student context, it is quite possible that the Court will
similarly limit liability in the peer context. The Court may even set a
higher standard for liability in that context as a school district has
even less authority over the actions of its students than its employees.
The school district possibly has less opportunity for notice regarding
the situation also. A decision such as this may further increase the
possibility that students will continue to suffer from sexual
harassment in schools.
CONCLUSION
The standard for school district liability in teacher-student sexual
harassment cases set forth in Gebser, although logical, may have
severe consequences on school children that have been subjected to
sexual harassment by their teachers. Because the standard for liability
is so difficult for a student to meet, school districts are relatively
isolated from liability. This could cause school districts to relax their
stance on sexual harassment in schools, and may cause more students
to suffer from the effects of sexual harassment than ever before.
70
Elizabeth A. Rice*
liability for student-student sexual harassment. Second, the imposition of this form of
liability would so materially affect schools' decision whether to accept Title IX
funding that it would require an express, unequivocal disclosure by Congress."
Id. at 1401.
Because this decision uses the same type of Title IX analysis as Gebser, it is quite likely
that the Supreme Court will affirm the decision, making it even more difficult for students to
receive damages for the sexual harassment they suffer in school.
70. See Clark, supra note 4.
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